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Abstract
A Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) network is an infrastructure capable of per-
forming long-distance and high-rate secret key agreement with information-theoretic
security. In this paper we study security properties of QKD networks based on
trusted repeater nodes. Such networks can already be deployed, based on current
technology. We present an example of a trusted repeater QKD network, developed
within the SECOQC project. The main focus is put on the study of secure key
agreement over a trusted repeater QKD network, when some nodes are corrupted.
We propose an original method, able to ensure the authenticity and privacy of the
generated secret keys.
Keywords: quantum cryptography, quantum key distribution, QKD network, trusted
repeater , secure key agreement, secret sharing
1 Introduction
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), often called in a more general context Quan-
tum Cryptography, is a technology that uses the properties of quantum mechanical
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systems in combination with information theory to achieve unconditionally secure
distribution of secret keys. In the last years, the field has rapidly evolved in terms
of both theoretical foundations and experimental implementations, with impressive
results [1, 2, 3].
The use of QKD has been, until now, mostly limited to point-to-point commu-
nication scenarios: the goal being to allow two remote parties linked by a quantum
channel and an authentic classical channel to share a common random binary string
- a key - that remains unknown to a potential eavesdropper, and to achieve in
practice the longest possible communication distance and the highest possible key
generation rate. Despite the progress in this direction, the performance of stand-
alone point-to-point QKD links will however remain intrinsically limited in terms
of achievable distance and rate. Building QKD networks based on an ensemble of
QKD links and intermediate nodes, could lift these limitations. The purpose of
this paper is to discuss the security aspects of QKD networks whose deployment is
feasible with current technology: trusted repeater QKD networks. The principle of
such networks consists in using trusted repeater nodes as classical relays between
QKD links. Indeed, provided that some level of trust can be granted to the network
nodes, such networks can guarantee unconditionally secure key exchange between
multiple users over potentially unlimited distances.
The material is organized as follows. Section 2 defines the setting of this work:
key agreement based on Quantum Key Distribution. It introduces the crypto-
graphic framework of Quantum Key Distribution, focusing on its most striking
cryptographic feature: the ability to establish secret keys with information-theoretic
security. Section 3 then describes the different possible types of QKD networks and
presents an example of a trusted repeater QKD network: the Secoqc QKD net-
work. Section 4 is then devoted to the full analysis of secure key agreement in a
trusted repeater QKD network in the case when some nodes may be arbitrarily ma-
licious (or corrupt). We propose a method allowing the communicating parties to
ensure the authenticity of a generated secret key without compromising its privacy.
We also discuss practical issues and provide a security analysis for this method.
Finally, in Section 5, we summarize our results and discuss possible modifications
in the model assumptions.
2 The Key Establishment Problem and Quan-
tum Key Distribution
In this work, we regard QKD as a cryptographic primitive, that is as a low-level,
universal cryptographic algorithm which can be used as a building block for cre-
ating highly complex, dedicated secure communication applications. In this sense,
the task of QKD is key distribution (or to use the proper cryptographic term key
establishment) between two legitimate parties at two distant locations.
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Key Establishment [4] is a standard security task, which is solved either by send-
ing the key from one party to the other over a channel assumed to be secure (key
transport) or by applying methods allowing the two parties to generate a common se-
cret key out of inputs provided by both parties (key agreement). Key establishment
methods are based on protocols, including specific, locally executed, algorithmic
steps and public communication. Assumptions on the intrinsic properties of the
communication channels, the power of the adversary, or the resources available to
the legitimate parties yield a variety of models, which depending on the methods
applied offer different levels of security.
In Section 2.1 we introduce information-theoretic security - a security level,
provided by QKD, which is also central to all protocols discussed in this paper.
Section 2.2 gives a short overview of models allowing information-theoretic security
followed by a detailed discussion of the crypto-properties of QKD, which are the
corner stone of the subsequent constructions. Section 2.3 addresses then perfor-
mance and applicability issues of typical realizations of this primitive and argues on
the necessity of designing QKD networks.
2.1 Information-Theoretically Secure Key Agreement
It is beyond the scope of the current paper to address in detail all possible levels
of security of key establishment models. We will be solely interested in the highest
level of security, known as information-theoretic (or unconditional) security. The no-
tion of information theoretic security (ITS), which is based on probability-theoretic
statements, goes back to Shannon [5, 6]. This notion was first introduced in the
context of a key agreement process by Wyner [7]. An exact definition depends on
the precise model assumptions. Here we describe ITS key agreement in general
terms (following [8]) of the two underlying essential ingredients Authenticity and
Privacy.
Two parties Alice and Bob perform a key establishment process, as a result of
which they obtain the keys KA and KB respectively of length n. We say that the
key agreement is (n)-secure if there exists a perfectly random, uniformly distributed
key K of length n, for which
i. (Authenticity): The probability that
(
(KA 6= K)∨ (KB 6= K)) ≤ ′(n) OR
the key agreement process is terminated with notification of failure,
ii. (Privacy): The information of the adversary Eve1 is bounded by I(K : E) ≤
′′(n),
whereby (n) = ′(n) + ′′(n). The intuitive meaning of this definition is that (n)
security is achieved when the probability that Alice and Bob do not abort if the
1Here the information of the adversary is symbolically meant in a generic sense. Strictly speaking
mutual information I(K : E) is defined only in the sense of Shannon entropy, i.e. when the the knowledge
of the adversary can be characterized by a probability distribution. See Section 2.2 for an adversary
holding quantum information.
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keys differ or that the adversary gets non-negligible information on the final key is
at most (n). In other words, except with probability (n) Alice and Bob generate
an identical key, which is unknown to the eavesdropper. It is important to note here
that ITS definitions and proofs, regard keys like K,KA,KB, as random variables,
depending on an input, which is different for different models. Keys shared finally
by Alice and Bob are actually values of these random variables. For the sake of
simplicity, we ignore this difference and use capitals in what follows.
2.2 QKD - an ITS Cryptographic Key Agreement Prim-
itive
It is well known [6, 8] that no cryptographic method relying solely on computation
and communication over insecure communication channels can ensure ITS key es-
tablishment. In any case additional resources given to Alice and Bob or alternatively
assumptions limiting the information available to the eavesdropper are needed to
this end. ITS key agreement is possible in a number of scenarios, based on bounded
knowledge available to the adversary, due to e.g. intrinsic noise in the commu-
nication channel or limitations of the memory capacity of the adversary (see [8]
and references therein). Alternatively ITS key agreement can also be achieved as
a consequence of the quantum nature of certain resources, e.g. a quantum com-
munication channel (needed for QKD), or distributed entanglement (needed for
quantum teleportation [9]), if such resources are available to the legitimate parties,
as these can render unfeasible a number of eavesdropping activities. All methods in
the discussed class additionally assume that classical communication channels are
authentic, i.e. that the adversary is restricted to passive eavesdropping on these
channels2. Recently it was found that all these methods can be formulated using a
unified quantum approach [10], based on embedding the purely classical scenarios
in an equivalent quantum framework.
Thus, from a logical point of view, QKD is just one of many methods enabling
ITS key agreement. From a more technological perspective, QKD is currently by
far the least restrictive approach. Indeed the eavesdropper is not limited by as-
sumptions, while the additional resource required - stable quantum communication
(transmission of light quanta over optical fibers or through free space) between Alice
and Bob is already by no means a mere theoretical construction but rather an ad-
vanced engineering practice (see e.g. [11]). Simultaneously, real-time key agreement
rates at distances below 100 km reach practically usable ranges [11, 12].
A QKD protocol generically includes two main activities: the legitimate par-
ties communicate over a quantum channel to get correlated bit strings and perform
post-processing over the public authentic channel to get identical secure keys or
notified termination in case of technical problems or significant eavesdropping ac-
2As pointed out below, this additional assumption can be lifted by applying ITS message authentica-
tion schemes.
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tivity (see e.g. [3] for details). Different methods to get correlations and different
types of post processing yield different QKD protocols. For a number of studied
QKD protocols one can derive full security proofs, which lead to explicit expres-
sions for the information-theoretically secure key generation rate (i.e. the length of
the generated secure key per unit time). Among the several proof techniques that
have been used in the past years, the most important ones rely on the uncertainty
principle [13, 14, 15, 16], the correspondence between entanglement distillation and
classical post-processing [17, 18], or information-theoretic notions and in particu-
lar smooth Renyi entropies [19, 20, 21]. The ultimate reason for ITS in this case
is the fact that eavesdropping attempts by the adversary on the quantum chan-
nel, unavoidably modify quantum signals and leave signatures in form of error.
The post-processing phase allows to eradicate the knowledge acquired by moderate
eavesdropping or to recognize that information leakage is irreparable and terminate
the protocol.
Information theoretic security as introduced in Section 2.1 above, ensures in
general composability [22], which means that the security of the key is guaranteed
regardless of the application it is used for: if an ε-secure key is used in a ε1-secure
task, the composed task would be (ε+ ε1)-secure. The importance of this issue for
QKD was recognized only recently [22].The problem was that initial security stud-
ies adopted a security definition which was not composable. Early security proofs
defined QKD security by analogy with the classical version of the Privacy require-
ment in Section 2.1: The eavesdropper, who holds a quantum state ρE , performs
the measurement M that maximizes her mutual information with the key K. This
defines the so-called accessible information Iacc(K : ρE) = maxE=M(ρE) I(K : E),
and the security criterion reads Iacc(K : ρE) ≤ ε(n). This was shown to be not com-
posable [23]. The main problem is that this definition of security assumes that the
eavesdropper transforms her quantum state into a classical one during key agree-
ment. In fact she can keep her quantum state and eventually use it to break a
composed task when the QKD key is used later on. A definition that leads to
composability for QKD requires a quantum reformulation of both ingredients (Au-
thenticity and Privacy) of ITS. These can be embedded into a single composable
requirement [22] utilizing trace-norm, 12‖ρKE − τK ⊗ ρE‖1 ≤ ε(n), where τK is the
completely mixed state on K.
Composability of QKD key has many implications. The most immediate one
is related to relaxing the assumption on availability of a public authentic chan-
nel. From a practical point of view this assumption is indeed too strong. Message
modification on classical channels is a simple technical task. This would, however,
allow the eavesdropper to easily mount man-in-the middle attacks by cutting both
the classical and the quantum channels, introducing corresponding QKD quantum
technology, and carrying out two QKD protocols, one with Alice pretending that
she is Bob and one with Bob taking over the role of Alice. Fortunately, it is possible
to give up the authenticity assumption by augmenting pure QKD with a message
authentication scheme, which can guarantee integrity of classical communication
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with information-theoretic security. This is achieved by means of continuous usage
of secret key in classical communication. In particular, each message is sent together
with a hash value, where hashing is performed with a keyed hash function for each
message whereby the function itself is chosen from some almost universal2 family
of functions, which is indexed by the secret key [24, 25]. The rate of key generation
of pure QKD is higher than the key usage for message authentication. Therefore,
putting things together, QKD is an information-theoretically secure key agreement
process, which needs a fixed (small) amount of pre-distributed initial secret key to
start with. Due to composability, subsequent authentication of communication can
be performed using part of the newly generated key3.
2.3 QKD Links: Performance and Application Domains
Having clarified the security of QKD we turn to more practical issues like the con-
nectivity it allows and its typical performance.
As far as connectivity is concerned it should be noted that QKD is intrinsi-
cally a point-to-point primitive (need for dedicated direct connection by a quantum
channel, necessity of peer-to-peer key pre-sharing), and is thus suitable for key es-
tablishment in a closed community. Further it should be pointed out that, as a
consequence of composability, if the QKD-generated key is used for an information-
theoretically secure communication, provided by One Time Pad (OTP) encryption
together with unconditionally secure authentication, then the composed protocol re-
alizes an unconditionally secure channel - a point-to-point QKD link4, which among
other tasks, can be used for key transport as discussed in the subsequent section.
Performance on the other hand is given by the secret key generation rate K(`),
which is a characteristic function of distance ` depending on the QKD protocol and
the specific implementation of a QKD link. This rate clearly varies from system
to system but in general terms it follows the curve of Fig. 1. As shown in this
figure, the logarithm of the rate of secret bit agreement initially falls at a given
power of the channel attenuation (depending on the implemented QKD protocol),
and features an exponential drop-off at long distances. In addition to reliability
and stability, the performance of practical QKD systems is usually measured by the
maximum communication distance they can reach, Dmax, and the secure key gener-
ation rate they can achieve at a useful range. The limiting factors vary greatly for
different protocols and implementations and range from hardware-related problems
such as the high dark count rates in typical single-photon counting detectors at
telecommunication wavelengths to algorithmic issues such as the finite efficiency of
3It is remarkable that the cryptographic key agreement primitive most widely used in current security
practice - namely the Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol [26], is also prone in its pure form to man-
in-the-middle attacks and for this reason has to be augmented by additional measures.
4A QKD link is realized by two quantum optics and processing devices - QKD devices - usually a
sender and a receiver, deployed with Alice and Bob respectively, which generate key and optionally can
perform simple key management and ITS encryption/authentication.
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Figure 1: Typical profile of the rate versus distance curve for a single QKD link.
error-correcting codes [3]. The distance at which direct QKD between two parties
is possible is roughly limited to 100 km in optical fibers for current systems, with
a possibility of reaching up to 200 km in the next few years, while the secret key
generation rate is currently limited to a few tens or hundreds of kbit/s depending
on the distance.
It is clear from the above discussion that QKD links suffer from intrinsic lim-
itations: they cannot be operated over arbitrarily long distances and their use is
restricted to point-to-point key exchange/secure communication between the two
endpoints of the quantum channel. A natural question that arises then is what
could be the application field of a technology with such characteristics. Obviously,
QKD links can be directly used in an environment, in which highly secure com-
munication is required between two parties over a relatively short distance. If
information-theoretic secure communication is the target, it can be achieved at
low rate (i.e. around 10-20 kbit/s). If broadband secure communication is needed
instead, then unconditionally secure communication is out of reach at a reasonable
cost. A highly secure point-to-point communication is still possible by combining
a pair of QKD devices with high end symmetric encryptors (typically running the
AES encoding scheme). In this case, the limit is set by the speed of encryption
(around 10 Gbit/s) whereas the key is exchanged at a rate allowed by the QKD
device-pair. It should be stressed that although the overall security offered by such
QKD link-encryptors is no longer information-theoretic it greatly exceeds the one
provided by any other currently existing method. Today, several QKD-based link
encryptors are commercially available [12], but their range of applications in prac-
tical communication systems is inevitably rather limited. A better way to exploit
the extremely high security standard offered by QKD and to extend the application
range to long-distance and multiple-user key establishment is to combine several
QKD links in order to form a QKD network. Indeed, as we will see in the next
sections, a number of the aforementioned limitations of QKD links can be overcome
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when it is possible to achieve QKD-based unconditionally secure key agreement
over a network [27, 28]. From this perspective the development of QKD network
architectures appears as a necessary step in order to achieve effective integration of
QKD into secure communication networks.
3 QKD Networks
We define a QKD network as an infrastructure for ITS key establishment, which
relies on quantum resources available to the legitimate participants, while not im-
posing bounds on the eavesdropping capabilities of the adversary, and allows connec-
tivity of parties that do not share a direct, fixed quantum channel. Optionally this
infrastructure should also allow lifting the restrictions typical for stand alone QKD
links - enable ITS key establishment over long distances (e.g. continental scale), in-
crease and maximize the throughput capacity (the key generation rate) and ensure
robustness against denial of service attacks and technical service break-downs.
The first proof-of-principle QKD network demonstrator, the “DARPA Quantum
network”, was deployed between Harvard University, Boston University and BBN
in 2004 [29, 30]. A highly integrated network demonstrator, developed within the
framework of the integrated FP6 Project Secoqc, which ensures network-wide ITS
key establishment, was deployed, tested, and demonstrated in Vienna [11].
3.1 Types of QKD Networks
The precise notion of ITS security depends on the particular QKD network model.
For this reason we start by considering the different QKD network types. These have
been known for a long time now and have been suggested already in [31]. There
are two principal approaches: a) quantum channel switching paradigm – creating
an end-to-end quantum channel (or more generally distributing quantum resources)
between Alice and Bob, or b) trusted repeater paradigm – transport of key over many
intermediate nodes, which are (at least partially) trustworthy i.e. not infiltrated by
the eavesdropper. The two approaches are essentially different and we shall discuss
them one after the other.
3.1.1 QKD Networks With Quantum Channel Switching
Optically switched quantum networks: These are networks in which some clas-
sical optical function, like beam splitting, switching, multiplexing, demultiplexing,
etc., can be applied to the quantum signals sent over the quantum channel. The
interest in such optical networking capabilities in the context of QKD networks is
that they allow going beyond the two-user QKD. Moreover, this can be done with
current technology. Active optical switching can be thus used to allow the selective
connection of any two parties with a direct quantum channel (the BBN DARPA
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quantum network contained an active 2-by-2 optical switch that could be used to
actively switch between two network topologies). Optical functions can thus be used
to realize multi-user QKD, and the intermediate sites do not need to be trusted,
since quantum signals are transmitted over a quantum channel with no interruption
from one end-user QKD device to the other one. In this sense the security analysis
coincides with that for a stand-alone QKD link. This QKD network model can how-
ever not be used to extend the distance over which keys can be distributed. Indeed,
the extra amount of optical losses introduced in the switching devices will in reality
decrease the transmission capacity of quantum channels and thus the maximal key
distribution distance. In addition, in a fully switched optical network any two par-
ties have to share an initial secret to be able to start the key agreement process. So,
overall, this type of networks are not scalable and thus suitable for long distance
QKD. Instead, they can be used in local or metropolitan areas.
Quantum repeater based QKD networks: To be able to extend the distance
over which quantum key distribution can be performed, it is necessary to fight
against propagation losses that affect the quantum signals as they travel over the
quantum channel. Quantum repeaters [32] can overcome the loss problem and can be
used to distribute entanglement between any two parties and therefore effectively
create an end-to-end quantum channel across the network. A quantum repeater
based network can thus be seen as a “fully quantum” network. As intermediate
network nodes do not get any information in the process of key generation, end-
to-end unconditional security is guaranteed without the need to trust these nodes.
In this sense the security analysis also coincides with that for a stand-alone QKD
link. Quantum repeaters however rely on elaborated quantum operations and on
quantum memories that cannot be realized with current technology. As discussed
in [33], quantum nodes called quantum relays could also be used to extend the
distance over which secure QKD can be performed5. Quantum relays are simpler
to implement than quantum repeaters since they don’t require quantum memories.
However, even quantum relays have not yet been technically realized. Moreover,
quantum relays would not allow secure QKD over arbitrary long distances.
3.1.2 Trusted Repeater QKD Networks
Trusted repeater QKD networks have been discussed in various contexts since the
advent of Quantum cryptography. Below we give a more formal definition, which
in turn simplifies the subsequent security analysis of such networks.
5Both quantum repeaters and quantum relays are devices that allow to teleport qubits over several
quantum channel segments, whereby entangled photons are distributed along the separate segments.
The main difference between quantum repeaters (see [3] for a simple model of a quantum repeater) and
quantum relays is that while in a quantum repeater received photons are kept in quantum memories in
order to bring entangled pairs from adjacent segments in correspondence, in a quantum relay one waits
for the event when all photons sent along the different segments are received - i.e. none is absorbed.
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We define a QKD trusted repeater network as an infrastructure composed of
QKD links, i.e. from a structural point of view pairs of QKD devices associated
by a quantum and a classical communication channel, each link connecting two
separate locations or nodes. A QKD trusted repeater network is then a connected
graph, the vertices of which are nodes, and the edges - QKD links.
We assume further that initial secret keys are only shared between neighboring
nodes (i.e. ones directly connected by a QKD link) and not between any arbitrary
pair. This assumption ensures that the number of initial secrets to be shared scales
(for wide area networks) with the number of network nodes and not with their
square. This in turn largely simplifies the initialization of a QKD network and the
adoption of additional nodes during operation.
QKD networks based on trusted key repeaters follow a simple principle: global
key distribution is performed over a QKD path, i.e. a one-dimensional chain of
trusted repeaters connected by QKD links, establishing a connection between two
end nodes. Secret keys are forwarded, by unconditionally secure key transport along
the QKD links of the path in a hop-by-hop fashion. (As mentioned above uncon-
ditionally secure transport over separate QKD-links is ensured by One Time Pad
encryption and ITS authentication, both realized with a local QKD key.) End-to-
end information-theoretic security is thus obtained between the end nodes, provided
that all the intermediate nodes can be trusted, as these possess the full commu-
nicated information. The trusted nodes play thus the role of (classical) trusted
repeaters. This architecture can be used to build a long-distance QKD network.
The advantage of such quantum networks is that they rely on QKD for link key
establishment, which guarantees that it is impossible to compromise the network
key distribution by direct attacks on the links.
Trusted repeater QKD networks can be implemented with today’s technology
since the nodes are essentially QKD devices plus classical memories and processing
units placed within secure locations. This concept had been tested in the BBN QKD
network and is also the basis of the Secoqc QKD network, which is exclusively
based on the trusted repeater approach.
3.2 Security Framework and the Architecture Secoqc
In the trusted repeater paradigm one can differentiate between two basic security
frameworks:
The first trust framework, already outlined above, is highly realistic and relevant
for internal networks belonging to a spatially distributed entity such as an industrial,
financial, governmental, or military institution, the backbone of a telecommunica-
tion provider, etc. This case is the main focus of Secoqc. The all-nodes-trusted
assumption obviously leads to a straightforward cryptographic conclusion on the
security of network connectivity. Together with the guarantee for an information-
theoretically secure transport from node to node provided by the underlying QKD
links it ensures unconditionally secure transport between Alice and Bob. Indeed in
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this case the eavesdropper is restricted to attacking the QKD links, which at best
can result in a denial of service but not in a gain of any information on the (key)
material which is securely transported. While this argument ultimately settles the
security analysis in the current model, a practical network realization requires ad-
dressing a multitude of architectural tasks, which are of more applied nature. These
tasks include:
• How to design the architecture of network nodes so that they can provide a
universal key distribution mechanism, while possibly integrating heterogeneous
QKD links [34]? (Here heterogeneity is meant in terms of the background QKD
protocol and device engineering.)
• How to specify the peer-to-peer key transport protocols?
• Which particular information-theoretically secure message authentication code
to select for implementation?
• How to design end-to-end network routing and transport protocols, taking into
account the unconditionally secure nature of the transport [28]?
• How to optimally plan the deployment of QKD networks, from a cost perspec-
tive, based on a study of the relation of cost and topology [44] ?
All of these issues have been at the core of the development work of Secoqc.
They have been addressed by a broad interdisciplinary team, and important ad-
vances have been made in all mentioned areas6. The outcome is a layered network
model effectively decoupling all classical communication as well as the network and
key transport functionality from the operation of the QKD devices. As a result, the
Secoqc network involves the ability to integrate, by using standard interfaces, a
completely heterogeneous physical layer consisting of different types of QKD devices
from multiple providers with a homogeneous network-wide end-to-end key transport
layer. The project has put in operation and tested a highly integrated prototype
in the metropolitan fibre-ring of Siemens in the city of Vienna (see Fig. 2 for a
schematic representation]. A public demonstration of this prototype took place
October 8, 2008.
The second framework type assumes that a limited number of nodes are taken
over by the adversary or corrupted. Obviously this framework is much more chal-
lenging from a cryptographic point of view. It is closely related to, although distinct
from, a classical problem dedicated to the study of secure message transmission over
untrusted networks [35]. In the latter model, it is assumed that any node of the
network can be taken over by the adversary but the number of corrupted nodes
6It should be noted that currently the results are only partially publicly available, as at present
the project team continues the effort of preparing internal deliverables for final publication. Unpub-
lished deliverables include: O. Maurhart, “Q3P: A Proposal”; M. Fitzi, “General Authentication Frame-
work in QKD”; J. Bouda, et al., “SECOQC Node Keystore Module and Crypto Engine”; J. Bouda, et
al.,“Encryption and Authentication in SECOQC”.
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Figure 2: The Secoqc network prototype in Vienna - a sketch.
is upper bounded by some threshold. Apart from the threshold, adversaries can
be arbitrarily malicious or Byzantine. Any such adversary that can take over no
more than t nodes is called t-bounded. In Section 4, we study the same problem for
trusted repeater QKD networks, where some nodes are corrupted and Byzantine.
We discuss an essential difference with respect to the classical case: a condition
that protocols in the classical setting should satisfy is too strong when private links
between neighbouring nodes are implemented using QKD.
It should be noted that this second framework is highly relevant for QKD net-
works owned by several, possibly competing entities, and mimics realistic telecom
network settings. It requires further research and in particular addressing of all
practically relevant tasks, already carried out in Secoqc for the case of all-node-
trusted networks.
4 Secret-Key Agreement Over a QKD Net-
work With Corrupted Nodes
In this section, we discuss privacy and authenticity of secret keys generated over
a trusted repeater QKD network with some corrupted nodes. We look at how to
characterize adversaries in this model and how to achieve security of the secret
keys generated over the QKD network against these adversaries. We compare a
QKD-network approach to the related classical problem of perfectly secure message
transmission over untrusted networks. We provide a mean by which Alice and Bob
can verify the authenticity of secret keys generated over a QKD network. This point
was originally addressed in the unpublished Secoqc Deliverable [36]. While the
current paper has been in preparation two preprints with similar objectives [37, 38]
have been published. The approach of the authors is similar to the one presented
here, but the techniques used to verify the authenticity of the keys are different.
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The advantage of our technique lies in its potential not only to differentiate between
authentic and forged keys, but as discussed below, to help revealing malicious parties
in some scenarios.
4.1 The Basic Setting
A straightforward strategy for Alice and Bob to generate a secret key unknown to
any other single node in the network is to use two disjoint paths. The final key K
between Alice and Bob is a secret shared by these paths.
Figure 3: Example:Two paths between Alice and Bob.
Figure 3 shows an example where Alice and Bob will generate a secret key
K = KS ⊕ KT using the keys KS and KT , which are secret-keys generated on
each path. Of course, the secret-key of each path is generated using point-to-point
QKD and the standard hop-by-hop mechanism. The secret-key K is secure and
unknown to each path as long as the paths do not fully collaborate in a malicious
way. It means that K is secure only if users can trust at least one path out of the
two. In general, if Alice and Bob generate a secret-key K from t paths then K will
be secure unless all t paths are dishonest and collaborate. We denote by {Ki}ti=1
the set of all t intermediary keys of length n and we let K :=
⊕t
i=1Ki where ’
⊕
’
denotes the bitwise exclusive-or.
Notice that the point-of-view described above is relevant in practice when each
path is owned by a single entity. In this case, nodes along a path do not have a
life on their own but are rather representative of a single authority. When only one
node misbehaves along a path, the entire path becomes dishonest. In this setting,
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paths are rather static since they correspond to physical authorities7.
4.2 Private Transmission Over Classical Untrusted Net-
works
We have informally discussed classical secure message transmission protocols in
Section 2. A little bit more formally, perfectly secure message transmission protocols
against t-bounded adversaries, i.e. adversaries controlling no-more than t nodes,
should satisfy the two following properties:
Guaranteed Delivery: No t-bounded adversary can prevent Alice’s message to
reach Bob, and
Privacy: No t-bounded adversary has access to more than a negligible amount of
information about the message sent by Alice.
In this model, Dolev, Dwork, Waarts, and Yung[35] have shown the following
with respect to one-way communication links. Links are said to be one-way if the
connectivity graph of the network is a directed graph.
1. When all communication links are one-way without feedback, they show that
it is necessary and sufficient to have 3t+ 1 vertex disjoint directed paths from
Alice to Bob. For any two nodes to be able to communicate privately, the
network graph must be 3t+ 1 connected (sufficient and necessary condition).
2. When all communication links (edges in the graph) are two-way, they show
that 2t+1 vertex disjoint paths are necessary and sufficient for Alice and Bob.
For any two nodes to be able to communicate privately, the network graph
must be 2t+ 1 connected (sufficient and necessary).
Notice that privacy is more demanding than reliability since in order to have a
private communication it is necessary to have a reliable one! More precisely, if in
a point-to-point network an adversary can hack up to t nodes then a t + 1 vertex
disjoint directed graph is sufficient for reliable communication alone.
This model has been generalized by Desmedt and Wang[40] where they consider
the possibility of using some feedback channels. Feedback channels become possible
when the connectivity graph of the network is not one-way directed outside all
nodes. When u feedback channels are vertex disjoint from the forward channels
they show that:
1. When there are 2(t− u) + 1 ≥ t+ 1 directed disjoint paths from Alice to Bob,
private message transmission is possible against t-bounded adversaries where
there are u directed node disjoint paths from Bob to Alice. As mentioned
above, these u paths must also be node disjoint from the 2(t − u) + 1 paths
from Alice to Bob.
7This basic model was introduced in one of the first cryptography deliverables of Secoqc [39].
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2. When there are 3t+ 1− u ≥ 2t+ 1 directed disjoint paths from Alice to Bob
and u directed paths from Bob to Alice (where as before paths from Alice
to Bob and paths from Bob to Alice are node disjoint) it is possible to have
private message transmission against t-bounded adversaries.
These results were improved in [41] by giving necessary and sufficient conditions for
private message transmission with feedback. Again for the case where the feedback
channels are vertex disjoint from the forward channels, we have:
Theorem 1.[[41]] Assume there are u directed node disjoint paths from Bob to
Alice, vertex disjoint from the forward channels. Then a necessary and sufficient
condition for private message transmission from Alice to Bob against any t-bounded
adversaries is that there are max {3t+ 1− 2u, 2t+ 1} directed node disjoint paths
from Alice and Bob.
Notice that all these results put serious restrictions on the number of available
disjoint paths between the two parties who want to communicate privately. Without
feedback, in order to protect against a mere 3 corrupted nodes, Alice and Bob must
be able to communicate through 10 disjoint paths while if all connections are two-
ways then 7 paths are required.
4.3 Differences with the QKD Setting
In this section we quickly and roughly discuss the main differences between the
classical and the QKD (trusted repeater) setting for private communication on un-
trusted networks.
The most obvious difference between the two settings is that while in the clas-
sical case messages are transmitted, a QKD network is mainly concerned with key
distribution. This difference is only cosmetic. It is easy to see that private mes-
sage transmission implies the ability to distribute secret-keys and that the ability
to distribute key implies the ability to send private messages. In other words, the
functionalities achieved in both settings are equivalent.
Like for private classical message transmission, privacy of secret-keys generated
through a QKD network can only be guaranteed if different paths do not overlap.
If a corrupted node N∗ is part of all quantum paths between Alice and Bob then no
private communication (or key) can possibly be established. Therefore and unless
nodes taking place in more than one paths are incorruptible, we can focus on network
architectures with non-overlapping paths.
While for classical private message transmissions point-to-point private commu-
nication is assumed between any neighboring nodes, in a QKD network no such
assumption is required since private point-to-point communication is provided by
QKD. It follows that all private message transmissions protocols and in partic-
ular the ones of [35, 40, 41] can be implemented using QKD to provide private
point-to-point communications between neighboring nodes. Using these classical
constructions would allow for key distribution and private communication against
15
more general network architectures than the one depicted in Fig. 3. Moreover, when
QKD is used to implement private point-to-point communication in the construc-
tions of [35, 40] for instance, t-bounded adversaries can in addition to controling
any t nodes, eavesdrop the classical communication between any other pair of nodes.
If in addition the adversary eavesdrops the quantum channel then although it be-
comes possible to implement a denial of service attack8 no information on a secret
key successfully generated can be obtained.
Then, how come that the situation depicted in Fig. 3 allows for Alice and Bob
to agree upon a secret against any 1-bounded adversaries while there are only 2
disjoint paths in the network? This seems to do better than the necessary 2t + 1
paths of [35]. The answer is that in the situation depicted, Alice’s and Bob’s keys
were not required to be identical but only to be both unknown to the adversary. It
is straightforward for one corrupted node to prevent Alice and Bob from agreeing
on an identical key. Moreover, Alice and Bob will not be able to detect that they
do not share a private key unless they already share an authentication key used to
establish the correctness of a newly generated secret key. Unlike for the classical
case described in Sect. 4.2, the rough setting described above does not address the
problem of guaranteed delivery. This may have important consequences for the
security of the architecture. Such weakness is not a desirable property for any
network architecture providing privacy. However, guaranteed delivery seems to be
asking for too much since QKD never guarantees successful key generation; a denial
of service attack is always possible in principle.
This circumstance calls for a slightly weaker delivery condition in the QKD-
network case in comparison to the fully classical setting. Instead of guaranteed
delivery, it is more appropriate to require either an authentic delivery to both parties
(the keys of Alice and Bob coincide and they know it) or a notification of network
failure. More formally we require a delivery condition which is analogous to an ITS
end-to-end key establishment between two arbitrary nodes (Alice and Bob) over the
network.
Authenticity: Any two parties Alice and Bob can send classical messages between
them in a way that will either guarantee delivery and therefore KA = KB or
lead to a notification of a network failure. This is weaker than the guaranteed
delivery criterion discussed in Section 4.2.
Privacy: No adversary has information about neither KA nor KB generated by
Alice and Bob during key generation. In particular, when KA = KB the
adversary has no information about the secret key.
Notice that for the sake of clarity we have deliberately simplified the definition
by omitting the (n) notation although we keep it in mind.
8Too much eavesdropping on the quantum channel will cause two neighbouring nodes to abort the
key generation.
16
4.4 Achieving Privacy and Authenticity in QKD-Networks
In order to achieve both authenticity and privacy in a QKD-network, it must sat-
isfy conditions similar to the ones we have seen in Theorem 1. In particular, two
parties who want to exchange a secret-key do not in general share an authentica-
tion key. It follows that testing the authenticity of a newly generated secret-key
must be performed by transferring an authentication tag through a network where
some nodes are corrupt. We shall see in the following that authenticity is guaran-
teed against any (` − 1)–bounded adversary if there are ` disjoint paths. Security
of the resulting secret-key is also guaranteed against (` − 1)–bounded adversaries
according the security criterion of Sect. 4.3 while it is guaranteed against any (`−2)–
bounded adversaries according a more stringent privacy criterion that we introduce
in Sect. 4.4.1. This is in any case better than the constructions discussed in Sect. 4.2
that, while satisfying the stronger security notion of guaranteed delivery, are secure
against t–bounded adversaries only if 2t+ 1 disjoint channels are available.
Let us get back to authenticity and privacy of the secret-keys generated in a
QKD-network.
4.4.1 Privacy
What do we mean when we say that a key obtained by Alice and Bob is private?
It is certainly not completely private since keys are also known to an adversary
controlling all paths. Even if one path is not under the control of the adversary,
Alice and Bob do not want their keys to be known by any node along a honest path.
In other words, trusted nodes should never get any information about secret keys
generated through them9.
Remember how secret keys are generated when Alice and Bob are connected
through ` disjoint paths P1, P2, . . . , P`. Let KAi and K
B
i be Alice’s and Bob’s secret
key respectively obtained from path Pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ ` using QKD between neighbors.
Alice and Bob then set their secret key as:
KA :=
⊕`
i=1
KAi and K
B :=
⊕`
i=1
KBi .
When no adversary acts actively, the key generation is such that KAi = K
B
i for all
1 ≤ i ≤ ` and therefore KA = KB.
Notice that any t–bounded adversary A can only learn keys KAi and/or KBi if
Pi is under the control of A. This is guaranteed by the privacy of QKD between
9Consider an honest path between Alice and Bob belonging e.g. to an organization related to them. It
could happen that Alice and Bob want to share sensitive information about the organization of this very
path. Even if by definition the path is honest and always properly executes the communication protocol,
it could still be curious. Obviously in many cases, as the one just outlined, Alice and Bob would prefer
that their communication remains private, i.e. unknown to the path.
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neighboring nodes. Let SA ⊆ {P1, . . . , P`} be the set of paths under the control of
A. Since A is t–bounded we have that |SA| ≤ t. By construction, any KAi and KBi
with Pi /∈ SA is completely unknown to A. It follows that both final keys KA and
KB are unknown to A as soon as ` > t. Let us be more precise. Keys of length
n generated by QKD between honest neighbors are guaranteed to be (n)–private
against any third party. (In Section 2 we have already pointed out that a key K
is (n)–private if given the state of the adversary, K is (n)–indistinguishable from
a random n–bit string.) Keys KA and KB must therefore be (n)–private against
any (`− 1)–bounded adversary A. In other words,
Lemma 1. Let KA = ⊕`i=1KAi and KB = ⊕`i=1KBi be such that {KAi }`i=1 and
{KBi }`i=1 have been generated through disjoint paths P1, . . . , P` where (KAi ,KBi ) is
(n)–private and satisfies KAi = K
B
i when Pi is a honest path. Then, (K
A,KB)
is (n)–private against any (`− 1)–bounded adversary but not necessarily such that
KA = KB.
As stated in the above lemma, A can certainly prevent Alice and Bob from
generating KA = KB. It suffices for one adversarial node to make its neighboring
node to believe they share a key while in fact they don’t. It is sufficient for A to send
classical messages different from what is expected in order for KA 6= KB. Although
such attack will not allow A to learn anything about KA and KB, it ensures that
no secure transmission can take place between Alice and Bob even though they are
not aware of this fact.
The authenticity of KA and KB should therefore be checked upon all new key
generations.
Another important point regarding privacy is the following. Suppose an ad-
versary controls ` − 1 paths P1, . . . , P`−1. The honest path P` without behaving
dishonestly could be able to determine Alice and Bob’s secret key if the adversary
decided the broadcast {KAi }`−1i=1 . Moreover, a dishonest path could be tempted to
publish all information they gather in order to implement a denial of service attack.
Publishing this information means that honest-but-curious paths would be able to
decipher any communication between the end users. This could deter users to use
their keys. It would therefore be desirable to enhance privacy against honest-but-
curious paths this way.
Privacy Against Honest-but-Curious Paths: Privacy is guaranteed against hon-
estly behaving paths that happen to learn information from adversarial paths
posting their secret information. Privacy in this case can be enforced simply
by having at least 2 honest (but maybe curious) disjoint paths.
Clearly, if two paths are honest (but curious) and even in the case when the
adversary publishes everything she knows, none of the curious but otherwise honest
path learns anything about the secret key. This follows since the secret key is
shared among two honest parties who therefore never publish any of their private
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information.
4.4.2 Authenticity
As mentioned above, in a QKD-network it is desirable to pre-distribute authenti-
cation keys only for point-to-point connections. This choice limits drastically the
complexity of initial key distribution phase required before key material can start
being generated. It follows that in this model, Alice and Bob do not necessarily
have an authentic channel they could use for testing the authenticity of a newly
generated key. As discussed in the previous subsection, it is important for any pair
of users to be able to guarantee the authenticity of a newly generated secret key
even though they don’t have access to an authentic channel between them.
It follows that authentication tags must be sent through channels that may be
under the control of the adversary. The key authentication process must guarantee
that Alice concludes that KA = KB if and only if Bob concludes that KB = KA.
Clearly, we also want that when KA = KB Alice and Bob identify this case with
success.
There are different methods to get this working. Suppose Alice and Bob have
generated keys KA and KB respectively where both are n–bit strings. They now
want to establish the authenticity of their respective key. This process should work
when any t paths out of ` disjoint paths are under the control of the adversary A.
That is, the authenticity or non-authenticity of a secret key should be guaranteed
against t-bounded adversaries.
Remember from Section 4.4.1 that over ` disjoint paths, no t-bounded adversary
for t < ` gets to know anything about both KA and KB. It suggests to use part of
KA and KB to authenticate KA and KB through the ` disjoint paths from which
each partial keys {KAi }`i=1 and {KBi }`i=1 has been generated.
This can be done as shown in the following example.
4.5 Example of a Simple QKD-Network
For simplicity, let us get back to the example of Figure 3 where Alice and Bob use
two non-overlapping paths P1 and P2 to perform a key exchange. In this case, the
secret key KA and KB must be authenticated and acknowledged even when P1 or
P2 is under the control of the adversary. From privacy however, when Alice and Bob
happen to have KA = KB they in fact have an authenticated channel between them.
Assume that MACκ(M) is the tag of a message authentication code for message
M under secret key κ. Suppose also that MACκ can be used to authenticate two
messages securely against impersonation even if both tags have been computed with
the same key κ.
One simple way to proceed in order to verify that KA = KB in this scenario is
as follows.
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• Alice and Bob pick the s first bits of their respective keys denoted by κA =
(KA)1...s and κB = (KB)1...s. Alice and Bob set KA = (KA)s+1...n and KB =
(KB)s+1...n respectively.
• Alice picks random λv ∈R {0, 1}n−s, for 1 ≤ v ≤ m where m and s are security
parameters. Alice then sets MA := (λv, λvKA)1≤v≤m ∈ {0, 1}m(n−s+1) where
‘‘ denotes the inner product mod 2.
• Alice sends MA to Bob together an authentication tag:
T := MACκA(MA) := MACκA((λv, λv KA)1≤v≤m).
The transmission of (MA, T ) is made through paths P1 and P2 (that is through
all paths).
• Let M1 and M2 be the message received from path P1 and P2 respectively.
Bob, upon reception of M1 = M2 = ((λ′v, rv)1≤v≤m, T ), verifies that
T
?
:= MACκB ((λ
′
v, λ
′
v KB)1≤v≤m). (1)
Since for λv chosen at random in {0, 1}n, when KA 6= KB
Pr (λv KA 6= λv KB) = 12 ,
it follows that if KA 6= KB then Bob will observe at least one 1 ≤ v∗ ≤ m such that
λ′v∗KB 6= rv∗ except with probability 2−m. When Bob verifies that T is well formed
and that for each 1 ≤ v ≤ m, λ′v KB = rv then he outputs res := ok. Notice that
when M1 6= M2 and one Mb, b ∈ {1, 2} is a properly authenticated transmission
of MA then Bob can still set res := ok in addition to identify that path P3−b is
dishonest. Otherwise, when M1 and M2 are not properly authenticated with key
κB, Bob outputs res := fail. Bob also outputs res := fail if he finds at least one
v∗, 1 ≤ v∗ ≤ m such that λ′v∗ KB 6= rv∗ . Bob then authenticates the output res
by computing the tag
T ′ := MACκB (res).
As for Alice’s transmission, Bob sends MB := (res, T ′) through each path P1 and
P2. Alice receives M ′1 and M ′2 from P1 and P2 respectively. If neither M ′1 nor M ′2
is properly authenticated with session key κA then Alice concludes that KA 6= KB.
If Bob has determined that KA = KB then (res, T ′) is a properly authenticated
message with key κA and can therefore be checked by Alice. Since at least one of P1
or P2 is honest, Alice will get Bob’s message MB in M ′1 or M ′2 (or both!) and this
can be checked since messages are authenticated. This means that if either P1 or
P2 misbehaves during the transmission of MB then Alice will be able to identify the
dishonest path. It follows that when Bob concludes KA = KB then Alice reaches
the same conclusion. Moreover, when KA 6= KB Alice also determines it since no
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message among M ′1 and M ′2 is properly authenticated since κA 6= κB and since
MAC is a secure authentication scheme. Notice that no adversary (controlling one
path in this case and ` − 1 paths when there are ` disjoint paths) can forge an
authenticated message since from the discussion of Section 4.4.1, the adversary has
no information about neither KA nor KB and therefore neither κA nor κB.
4.6 Providing Secret Key Authenticity
In this section, we describe how Alice and Bob can determine the authenticity of a
newly generated secret key given that they use a secret-key generation over ` > t
disjoint paths P1, . . . , P`. We assume that MACκ(M) denotes the authentication
tag of message M using key κ ∈ {0, 1}s. For simplicity, we also assume that MAC
is secure against impersonation even given two messages-tags pairs authenticated
with the same key. These schemes are easy to construct and we will discuss this
point in Section 4.9. In the following, we denote by pim the probability of successful
impersonation even after having seen two pairs message-tag.
Now, we have to make an assumption about the behavior of honest paths. When
Alice sends a message M to Bob through honest path P , M is sent from node-to-
node until it reaches Bob. Each transmission between neighboring nodes Ni and
Ni+1 is authenticated. An adversary however could, in theory, prevent M from
reaching Ni+1. If this is the case, Alice could be unaware of Bob’s status since she
never received his last message. This suggests to consider quantum networks where
Any classical message M from neighboring nodes Ni to Ni+1 along
a honest path will eventually reach Ni+1. (2)
The reason why this assumption does not seem to be too strong is the following.
Any neighboring nodes Ni and Ni+1 share an authentication key. They can therefore
use any network connecting them in order to transmit authenticated information.
Although possible, it is unlikely that an adversary can succeed in preventing Ni and
Ni+1 from communicating forever. In practice, the internet can almost be considered
as a network where information between parties is always delivered. Notice also that
if messages between neighboring nodes cannot be delivered then the privacy of keys
will never be compromised but only the agreement between the end users upon
whether their respective keys are identical is.
The following procedure generalizes the approach described in Section 4.5 to the
case where the number of channels is arbitrary. We shall prove in the following that
this scheme provides a secure way of verifying the authenticity of the secret keys
under assumption (2).
1. Public information: |KA| = |KB| = n, m < n− s (security parameter for the
probabilistic test of KA = KB), and s < n (the key size for a public MAC),
and ` ≥ 2 (number of disjoint paths).
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2. Alice sets κA := (KA)1...s, and KA := (KA)s+1...n and similarly Bob sets
κB := (KB)1...s, and KB := (KB)s+1...n.
3. Alice picks random n−s-bit strings λv ∈R {0, 1}n−s for v = 1 . . .m. She forms
the m(n− s+ 1)-bit string MA := (λ1||λ1 KA, . . . , λm||λm KA) where ‘||‘
denotes string concatenation. She computes the tag T associated to MA:
T := MACκA(MA).
4. Alice sends copies of (MA, T ) to Bob through each path P1, . . . , P`. Along
each path Pi, (MA, T ) is transmitted from point to point in an authentic way
using the authentication key shared between neighbors.
5. Bob collects all messages (M1, . . . ,M`) received from paths P1, . . . , P`. Bob
locates one 1 ≤ h ≤ ` such that Mh = (MhA, T h) and T h = MACκB (MhA). If
such h cannot be found then Bob sets result = 0. Otherwise, Bob verifies
that for MhA = (λ
′
1||λ′1 KB, . . . , λ′m||λ′m KB). If this is not the case then
result = 0 otherwise Bob sets result = 1.
6. Bob sends (result, T ′) where T ′ = MACκB (result) through each path Pi
the same way as Alice did it for (MA, T ). Let M ′1, . . . ,M ′` be all messages
received through each path P1, . . . , P`.
7. Alice verifies that for some 1 ≤ h′ ≤ `, Mh′ = (r′′, T ′′) where T ′′ = MACκA(r′′)
and r′′ ∈ {0, 1}. If it is not the case then she sets result′ = 0, otherwise she
sets result′ = r′′.
8. final step:
• If result = 1 Bob accepts key KB as a newly authenticated secret key
with Alice. Otherwise, KB is discarded.
• If result′ = 1 then Alice accepts key KA as a newly authenticated secret
key with Bob. Otherwise, KA is discarded.
Notice that it is important that at least one copy of both MA and result even-
tually reaches its intended receiver. Otherwise, Bob after detecting KA = KB could
leave Alice unaware of this fact if the adversary prevent message MB from ever
reaching Alice untampered with. In this case Alice would conclude that Bob ob-
served KA 6= KB. Under assumption 2 however, it is guaranteed that Alice and
Bob agree on the output of the authentication process. Moreover, when KA = KB
is agreed upon by Alice and Bob then KA = KB except with vanishingly small
probability. Before proving this, let’s denote by δK,K′ the function that returns 1 if
K = K ′ and 0 otherwise where K and K ′ are bit strings. We’re now ready to prove
the correctness of the key authentication process.
Lemma 2. Assume Alice and Bob have generated (n)–private secret keys KA ∈
{0, 1}n and KB ∈ {0, 1}n through disjoint paths P1, . . . , P`−1, and P` under assump-
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tion (2). The secret key authentication process results in
Pr (result = result′ = δKA,KB ) ≥ (1− (n))(1− 2−m)(1− pim)2`−2. (3)
Proof. Suppose first that KA and KB are uniform and random from any t–bounded
adversary. This happens with probability at least 1 − (n) by definition of (n)–
privacy.
Second, suppose that KA = KB. By assumption (2), there exists at least one
h such that Mh = (MhA, T
h) and T h = MACκB (M
h
A). The probability pno−del that
Mh = (MhA, T
h) 6= (MA, T ) is no more than the probability that one impersonation
of adversary A succeeds. By definition of the impersonation probability pim for the
MAC scheme, we have
pno−del ≤ 1− (1− pim)`−1 (4)
since the adversary is (` − 1)–bounded. Upon successful delivery of (MA, T ), Bob
always sets result = 1 since the equality test never gets it wrong when KA =
KB. Bob’s message (result, T ′) to Alice will also be received as such by the same
probability pno−del as defined in (4). It follows that,
Pr (result = result′ = 1|KA = KB) ≥ (1− pim)2`−2. (5)
Third, assume that KA 6= KB. As when KA = KB, Bob will successfully receive
(MA, T ) except with probability pno−del. Either Bob manages to find h such that
Mh = (MhA, T
h) and T h = MACκB (M
h
A) or not. If not then by assumption 2 it
follows that KA 6= KB and Bob will set result = 0. By the argument that lead to
(5) we have,
Pr (result = result′ = 0|KA 6= KB, (∀h)[T h 6= MACκB (MhA)])
≥ (1− pim)2`−2.
(6)
Finally, suppose that there exists h such thatMh = (MhA, T
h) and T h = MACκB (M
h
A).
Except with probability at most pno−del it is the case that (MhA, T
h) = (MA, T ). In
particular, it means that Bob knows λv KA and λv for all 1 ≤ v ≤ m. Provided
KA 6= KB, Bob will determine this fact except with probability perror ≤ 2−m. Using
the same argument as the one that lead to (5), we get
Pr (result = result′ = 0|KA 6= KB, T h = MACκB (MhA))
≥ (1− 2−m)(1− pim)2`−2.
(7)
Putting (5), (6), and (7) together leads to (3) after an extra multiplicative factor
of (1− (n)) is added since the analysis above holds when KA and KB are uniform
and random from the adversary’s point of view which happens with probability
1− (n). 
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4.7 Recovery from Privacy Losses
Lemma 2 tells us that results of both parties coincide and represent the answer
to the question KA
?= KB except with negligible probability. What the theorem
does not tell us is how much privacy is preserved by the authentication process. In
particular, all parity checks {λv KA}mv=1 leaks m bit of information about the key
to the adversary. How do Alice and Bob get rid of this extra leakage? One way
to do it would be to use privacy amplification but this seems an overkill. Using
the interpretation of (n)–privacy, Alice and Bob can do better without the need
to agree upon a random hashing function or to communicate. That is, privacy
amplification can be performed by a deterministic process.
Let us describe what Alice would do to remove the information on KA ∈
{0, 1}n−s leaked by the parity check sent to Bob during the authentication process.
Suppose furthermore that the original KA was (n)–private toward any (` − 1)–
bounded adversary as guaranteed by Lemma 1. The following procedure gets rid of
all extra information leaked during the key-authentication process provided it was
successful.
1. Let {λv}mv=1 be the set of parity checks sent by Alice to Bob during the key
authentication process. Suppose the process was successful (i.e. result′ = 1)
was initially run upon an (n)–private key KA. The following produces a final
(n)–private secret key K∗A.
2. Set the set of trashed bits to be initially empty f := ∅.
3. For each 1 ≤ v ≤ m do:
(a) Find the smallest 1 ≤ i ≤ n− s such that λv,i = 1 such that i /∈ f.
(b) If such i exists then f := f ∪ {i} otherwise do nothing.
4. Set K∗A := KA − f (i.e. in other words, we remove from KA all positions
i ∈ f).
Bob can certainly perform the exact same procedure on his side since he knows
{λv}mv=1 upon result = 1. Clearly, if KA = KB then K∗ = K∗A = K∗B and
K∗ is shorter than KA and KB by at most m-bits. This is optimal since m bits
of information about KA (and KB!) are disclosed by the key authentication process.
Lemma 3. The deterministic privacy amplification procedure described above when
run upon key K = KA = KB ∈ {0, 1}n−s that were initially (before the parity
checks were revealed) (n)–private produces an (n)–private final secret-key K∗ ∈
{0, 1}n−s−m.
Proof. Let K = KA = KB be the keys agreed upon after the key authentication
process was successful. Suppose that K is really uniform and random from the ad-
versary’s point of view. Then, each time a new bit at position i is removed at Step 3b
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when inspecting λv all bits in the remaining positions remain uniformly distributed
given λ1K, . . . , λvK. If such a position i cannot be found then obviously λvK
does not leak any extra information about K∗ since all bits (which are uniform and
random) involved in the new parity check have already been removed from KA.
In fact K is not uniform and random from the adversary’s point of view but
rather (n)–private. However, except with probability (n), K really behaves like
a uniform and random key from the adversary’s perspective. It follows that except
with probability (n), the deterministic privacy amplification process produces a
uniform and random key K∗ against the adversary. It follows that K∗ is (n)-
private. 
We shall call this privacy amplification scheme deterministic privacy amplifica-
tion since it is deterministic and does not involve any communication between Alice
and Bob.
4.8 Putting Things Together
We are now ready to provide the final statement regarding the key authentication
scheme described in the previous sections. By key authentication process we loosely
mean the procedures described in Sections 4.6 and 4.7. That is, it includes the
deterministic privacy amplification procedure run independently by Alice and Bob
after the authentication process described in Sect. 4.6 has resulted in a success:
result = result′ = 1.
Theorem 2. Let K∗A ∈ {0, 1}n−s−m and K∗B ∈ {0, 1}n−s−m be the final secret
keys generated after key authentication and deterministic privacy amplification as
described above upon initial (n)–private KA,KB ∈ {0, 1}n. Suppose the MAC used
during key-authentication has impersonation probability at most pim even given two
message-tag pairs authenticated with the same key. Then, against any (` − 1)–
bounded adversary we have,
Pr (result = result′ = δK∗A,K∗B ) ≥ (1− (n))(1− 2−m)(1− pim)2`−2,
and K∗A and K
∗
B is 2
−m + 2`pim + 2(n)–private. If in addition the adversary is
(` − 2)–bounded then the final secret key remains private the same way against
honest-but-curious paths.
Proof. The only thing that does not directly follows from Lemma 2 and 3 is
the statement about the privacy of K∗A and K
∗
B. Privacy only makes sense when
result = result′ = δK∗A,K∗B = 1. When this applies however the final secret-key
K∗ = K∗A = K
∗
B is (n)–private as it was shown in Lemma 3. The result follows
immediately. 
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4.9 What MAC to Use?
Any authentication scheme with small enough impersonation probability pim can be
used by Alice when she sends MA. The authentication schemes used in Secoqc fol-
low [42, 43]. These authentication schemes can also be used for key-authentication.
However, the impersonation probability pim should hold even given two message-tag
pairs generated using the same key.
This can be achieved the obvious way by setting κA = (κ′A, κ
′′
A) = (K
A)1...2s and
κB = (κ′B, κ
′′
B) = (K
B)1...2s in the key authentication process. Alice authenticates
message MA with sub-key κ′A which Bob verifies with sub-key κ
′
B. Bob’s message
MB is authenticated with sub-key κ′′B while Alice verifies with sub-key κ
′′
A. Clearly,
if the MAC scheme has impersonation probability at most pim given one message-
tag pair then this way of authenticating as impersonation probability at most 2pim
against two message-tag pairs generated with the same key. There are many other
ways of building MACs suitable for our application[24]. The one mentioned above
is probably the simplest but certainly not the best one in terms of key size.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have reviewed the concept of a QKD network and have discussed
different models of QKD networks. We have in particular focused on trusted re-
peater networks and have studied the case when part of the nodes are not to be
trusted and could be arbitrarily malicious. We have shown how to ensure that Alice
and Bob share identical and private keys after key generation over the network.
We suppose that Alice and Bob do not share key material to start with. They
only share keys with their direct neighbours. However, we suppose that classical
messages through honest paths are eventually delivered to their intended recipient
(assumption (2)).
We conclude that secret keys can be generated through ` disjoint paths in a
private and authentic way against (`− 1)–bounded adversaries and against (`− 2)–
bounded adversaries with honest-but-curious paths.
It should be noted that assumption (2) can be relaxed further without unde-
sirable consequences for the security of the key authentication process. It suffices
for only one honest path to eventually deliver classical information to the intended
receiver. This does not modify by any means neither the protocol nor its security
analysis. Indeed, an honest path will always allow parties to agree upon the au-
thenticity of the secret key. Only one properly authenticated message from Alice
to Bob and one from Bob to Alice is sufficient to assess the equality of both keys.
Otherwise, if the keys are different then both parties will anyway conclude that keys
do not match.
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